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ISSUES
This case raises two interrelated
questions: What is the appropriate
interpretation of the statutory
phrase "independent judgment" as
used in § 2(11) of the National
Labor Relations Act in defining
which individuals are supervisors;
and who has the burden of proving
that an employee meets the defini-
tion of supervisor?
FACTS
In early 1997, the Kentucky State
District Council of Carpenters
(hereinafter "the union") began an
organizing drive among the profes-
sional and nonprofessional employ-
ees-including rehabilitation coun-
selors, registered nurses, licensed
practical nurses, rehabilitation
assistants, and recreational assis-
tants-employed by Kentucky River
Community Care (hereinafter "the
employer"). The union eventually
won a representation election and
was certified by the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter "the
Board") as the bargaining represen-
tative for the employees in the
above-described bargaining unit.
The employer refused to bargain
with the union, however, claiming
that the bargaining unit was inap-
propriate under the National Labor
Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA")
because it included certain nurses
who were supervisory employees.
The employer asserted that these
nurses directed the work of other
employees and therefore met the
definition of "supervisor," which
includes individuals having the
authority responsibly to direct other
employees "if ... the exercise of
such authority ... requires the use of
independent judgment." NLRA §
2(11).
The Board held that the employer's
refusal to bargain with the union
violated § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,
rejecting the employer's argument
that the work of these nurses
required the use of independent
judgment. The Board determined
that the nurses' work in directing
other employees regarding issues of
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patient care involved the use of pro-
fessional knowledge, which was not
the same as "independent judg-
ment" within the meaning of §
2(11). Kentucky River Community
Care, 323 NLRB No. 209 (1977).
The employer filed a petition with
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
to review the Board's decision
regarding the supervisory status of
the nurses in question. The Sixth
Circuit reversed the Board's conclu-
sion, holding that the Board's inter-
pretation of "independent judg-
ment" was not entitled to deference
and found that the nurses were
supervisors. Kentucky River Care
Community, Inc. v. NLRB, 193 F.3d
444 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Board asked the Supreme Court
to review the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion, and the Court granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari. 121
S.Ct. 27 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
In NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp., 511 U. S. 571
(1994) (hereinafter HCR), the Court
noted that several of the phrases
used in § 2(11) are ambiguous, such
as the phrase "independent judg-
ment," so the Board "needs to be
given ample room to apply them to
different categories of employees."
Id. at 579. When statutory language
is ambiguous, the Supreme Court
has held that "the question for the
court is whether the [administra-
tive] agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the
statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1995).
Therefore, the crux of the present
case revolves around the question of
whether or not the Board's interpre-
tation of "independent judgment" is
a permissible construction of §
2(11) of the NLRA.
The Board argues that it has tradi-
tionally held that an employee's
exercise of ordinary professional
judgment in directing less skilled
employees does not amount to the
use of independent judgment.
Advising less experienced workers
how to deal with specific work prob-
lems involves technical judgment
based on the employee's profession-
al training. This judgment is based
on learned skills, not significant
individual discretion beyond this
special learned competence.
The Board reasons that this inter-
pretation is consistent with both the
text and legislative history of §
2(11). The purpose behind the
inclusion of the "independent judg-
ment" requirement in defining
supervisory status was to differenti-
ate between true supervisors and
employees with minor authority
over co-workers. Congress intended
to formulate a narrow exclusion
with the aim of identifying those
individuals vested with genuine
managerial prerogatives. The legisla-
tive history shows that Congress
understood the supervisory exclu-
sion to apply to employees who did
not work at a trade but instead
supervised those who did, as
opposed to excluding skilled
employees who instruct and guide
other workers and who themselves
work at a trade.
The interpretation of ambiguous
terms often requires the agency
empowered to enforce the statute to
accommodate conflicting policies.
In this case the Board says that, in
arriving at its interpretation, it was
attempting to accommodate the pol-
icy favoring broad coverage of the
NLRA versus the policy of giving an
employer unfettered discretion over
its labor relations agents.
The Board's interpretation takes
into account the statute's express
inclusion of "professional" employ-
ees as employees who are entitled
to union representation. Congress
expressly indicated its understand-
ing that professional employees
ordinarily direct the work of less
skilled colleagues and yet are still
entitled to be protected under the
coverage of the statute.
The Board contends that its inter-
pretation is rational and consistent
with the language and the legislative
history of the NLRA and has been
consistently applied by the Board in
cases involving both the health-care
industry and in non-health-care set-
tings. Therefore, its interpretation is
entitled to deference by the
reviewing courts and the Sixth
Circuit erred in rejecting the
Board's interpretation.
The employer responds that the
Board's distinction between "inde-
pendent" judgment and "profession-
al" judgment is merely an attempt
to revive the patient-care analysis
already expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in HCR. The HCR
case also involved a question con-
cerning the supervisory status of
certain employees in the health-
care industry. The phrase at issue in
that case was whether a nurse's
authority was exercised "in the
interest of the employer," another
requirement under § 2(11) in order
for an employee to be considered a
supervisor. In HCR the Board had
argued that a nurse is not exercising
authority in the interest of the
employer if the exercise is inciden-
tal to the treatment of patients. The
Court rejected that argument, rea-
soning that the business of a health-
care institution is patient treatment
and therefore authority exercised in
relation to patient treatment is
exercised in the interest of the
employer. According to the employ-
er, the Board's forced distinction
between professional judgment and
independent judgment in the
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instant case is similarly flawed.
Independent judgment means that a
decision is based on the thought
processes of the individual rather
than on an outside force. Using pro-
fessional judgment to direct other
employees on how to handle
patients requires the employee to
make decisions based on her own
thought processes.
Moreover, the employer argues, the
Board's false distinction between
independent and professional judg-
ment will make it virtually impossi-
ble for a professional employee to
ever be considered a supervisor.
Last, the employer contends that
the Board's interpretation is also
flawed because it is based on a poli-
cy bias in favor of finding employers
liable for violating the NLRA, which
is not an appropriate basis for
choosing among competing statuto-
ry policies.
On the issue of who has the burden
of proving whether an employee
meets the definition of a supervisor,
howsoever that definition is inter-
preted, the Board treats a claim of
supervisory exclusion as an affirma-
tive defense that must be proven by
the proponent of the exclusion. The
NLRA defines an employee as "any
employee ... but shall not include ...
any individual employed as a super-
visor." Section 2(2). The statutory
language frames the issue as an
exception to the general rule that an
employee is "any employee." A
basic tenet of statutory construction
holds that a party claiming the ben-
efit of an exception to a generally
applicable rule bears the burden of
proving that the exception applies.
The employer argues that the Board
should have the burden of proving
that an employee is a supervisor
because as a matter of litigation the-
ory, the burden of proof is on the
party alleging that a statute has
been violated. Here the Board is
arguing that the employer has
refused to bargain with the union in
violation of the statute. In order to
prove that such a refusal violates
the NLRA, the Board is required to
prove that the bargaining unit for
which the union was certified as the
representative is an appropriate bar-
gaining unit. It is inappropriate to
include supervisors in a bargaining
unit. Thus, since the appropriate-
ness of the bargaining unit is an ele-
ment of the violation, the Board
bears the burden of proving that the
employees included in the unit are
not supervisors.
SIGNIFICANCE
A nondeferential standard of review
invites parties to routinely contest
Board decisions on supervisory sta-
tus, which is a contested issue in
many representation cases.
Moreover, these determinations
involve highly fact-intensive situa-
tions concerning the specific tasks
and duties of the contested employ-
ees, not allowing for readily trans-
ferable results from one case to the
next. Nondeference, therefore,
would have the effect of prolonging
the representation process, under-
mining the statutory policy in favor
of peaceful and expeditious resolu-
tion of representation disputes. This
case provides a prime example of
such delay: The union was certified
as the bargaining representative on
April 7, 1997, and now, almost four
years later, the issue of representa-
tion is still not settled.
Nurses work under stressful condi-
tions, often at low wages and with
high rates of injuries, conditions
that can often be ameliorated
through the collective bargaining
process. To interpret "independent
judgment" as including the use of
discretion based on professional
training could have the effect of
depriving many nurses of the right
to organize, since most nurses pro-
vide guidance to co-workers on
issues relating to patient treatment.
On the other hand, in view of both
the nursing shortage and the
increased cost pressures faced by
the health-care industry, employers
are increasingly depending on nurs-
ing staff not only to perform their
own professional duties but also to
supervise others in the performance
of their nursing duties. In order to
deliver quality care more efficiently,
health-care providers rely on their
nursing staff to ensure quality per-
formance by other workers in pro-
viding patient care. It is vital that
these nurses' undivided loyalty rest
with the employer; placing them in
bargaining units with the employees
they supervise could lead to lax
oversight of health-care workers and
endanger the safety of the patients
under their care.
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